Culture & Nationalism
Yogendra Yadav: India is a State-Nation, Not a Nation-State https://www.forbesindia.com/article/independence-special-2013/yogendra-yadav-india-is-a-statenation-not-a-nationstate/35883/1 Aug 16, 2013
India has created a new model to democratically deal with deep diversities. It accepts that political boundaries do not and need not coincide with cultural boundaries
It was natural for some Indian nationalists to try the other option. Instead of stretching the interpretation, they wanted to bend the reality itself by trying to forge a unity that would conform to received standards. This is how the politics of Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan was born. Guru Golwalkar, the iconic ideologue of the RSS, saw the challenge of nation building as requiring five unities: Geographical, racial, religious, cultural and linguistic. This project involved creating a uniform national community in the light of the cultural self-image of the dominant community. Thus their politics focussed on Hindi as the national language, Hindutva as the national way of life and the north Indian Hindi-speaking region as the heartland... This vision of nationhood is more European than Indian. It draws upon a model of the nation-state that emerged in Europe.
If there was one thing Tagore, Gandhi and Nehru shared, it was their rejection of the idea that India’s unity requires uniformity.
India’s ‘asymmetrical’ federalism recognises the unique situation of various states. The cultural policy of the state recognises and supports more than one cultural identity. The co-existence of Indian identity with other regional and religious identities is taken for granted. Political parties that raise regional and ethnic issues are not thrown out; they are brought within the pale of legitimate democratic negotiation of power. Quietly, but surely, India has created a new model of how to deal democratically with deep diversities.
India’s experience with diversities is not without its problems. The continuing alienation in Kashmir, and the ongoing slow-burning insurgencies in Nagaland and Manipur serve as a reminder of the failures of this experiment. But these are best seen as failures to implement the model of state-nation in its true spirit rather than the failures of this model itself.
From Nation-State to State-Nation MILAN VAISHNAV https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/12/18/from-nation-state-to-state-nation-pub-80642 DECEMBER 18, 2019 HINDUSTAN TIMES
Whereas a nation-state insists on alignment between the boundaries of the State and nation, a state-nation allows for a multiplicity of “imagined communities” to coexist beneath a single democratic roof. It recognises that citizens can have multiple, overlapping identities that need not detract from a larger sense of national unity.
Most of India’s social cleavages — caste, region, and language — do not pose an existential threat to democratic balancing, thanks to their cross-cutting nature. The only cleavage that can be reduced to a bipolar majority-minority contest is religion.
WESTERN NATIONALISM AND EASTERN NATIONALISM https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii9/articles/benedict-anderson-western-nationalism-and-eastern-nationalism
The highlight of this article, is that globalisation, financialisation, migration, communications, internet has made a new kind of virulent nationalism.. the pravasi nationalism.. long-distance nationalism: a nationalism that no longer depends as it once did on territorial location in a home country. Some of the most vehement Sikh nationalists are Australians, Croatian nationalists, Canadians; Algerian nationalists, French; and Chinese, Americans. (check this
My notes on this article:
Imagined Communities : nationalisms of all varieties cannot be understood without reflecting on the older political forms out of which they emerged: kingdoms, and especially empires of the pre-modern and early modern sorts.
The earliest form of nationalism—one that I have called creole nationalism—arose out of the vast expansion of some of these empires overseas, often, but not always, very far away. It was pioneered by settler populations from the Old Country, who shared religion, language and customs with the metropole but increasingly felt oppressed by and alienated from it. The United States and the various states of Latin America which became independent between 1776 and 1830 are the famous examples of this type of nationalism.
A second form of nationalism, extensively discussed in Imagined Communities, and which seems relevant here, is what I have called, following Hugh Seton-Watson, official nationalism. This form of nationalism arose historically as a reactionary response to popular nationalisms from below, directed against rulers, aristocrats and imperial centres. The most famous example is provided by Imperial Russia, where the Tsars ruled over hundreds of ethnic groups and many religious communities, and in their own circles spoke French—a sign of their civilized difference from their subjects. It was as if only peasants spoke Russian. ..London tried to anglicize Ireland (with substantial success), Imperial Germany tried to germanify its share of Poland (with very little success), Imperial France imposed French on Italian-speaking Corsica (partial success) and the Ottoman Empire Turkish on the Arab world (with no success). ..
However, by far the most spectacular and ironical case is provided by the Celestial Empire, ruled from 1644 till its collapse, less than 90 years ago, by a Manchu—and also Manchu-speaking—dynasty. the dynasty vanished in 1911 and, to some extent, the Manchus as well.
When Chinese nationalism did finally arise, it was rather late in world-historical time...China was deeply penetrated by the various imperialisms of the age, including Japanese, but it was not actually colonized. There were too many competing imperialisms by then, and even Great Britain, which was having trouble swallowing vast India, blanched at the thought of swallowing even vaster imperial China...They thus without much thought, the popular nationalism of the worldwide anti-imperialist movement with the official nationalism of the late nineteenth century; and we know that this latter was a nationalism which emanated from the state, not the people, and thought in terms of territorial control, not popular liberation. ..Imperial China came, at different times, to accept the kinds of boundaries and new states that imperialism and anticolonial nationalism were forging, at least at the periphery: Mongolia, Korea, Vietnam, Burma, India and Pakistan.
It is probably fair to say that all organized societies in former times depended (in part) for their cohesion on visions of the past which were not too antagonistic to one another. These visions were transmitted by oral tradition, folk poetry, religious teachings, court chronicles, and so forth... When nationalism entered the world late in the eighteenth century, however, all this changed fundamentally. The accelerating speed with which social, cultural, economic and political change took hold, motored by the industrial revolution and modern communications systems, made the nation the first political–moral form which based itself firmly on the idea of progress.
What has happened in effect is that though there are countless traces of the past around us—monuments, temples, written records, tombs, artefacts, and so on—this past is increasingly inaccessible, external to us. At the same time, for all kinds of reasons, we feel we need it, if only as some sort of anchor. But this means that our relationship to the past is today far more political, ideological, contested, fragmentary, and even opportunistic than in ages gone by.
Let me finally turn to another form of nationalism, which, so far as I can tell, is clearly European in origin, and ask whether it can be said still to be Western in any useful sense. This form I call linguistic nationalism... Both India and the Philippines have failed—if that is the right word—to create a generally accepted national language. The colonial language—English and American—remains the effective language of the state and of the national elite. A vigorous English-language—and nationalist—literary culture exists in both places, and has accommodated itself to no less vigorous Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, Tagalog and Cebuano cultures. Old Pakistan broke into two separate nations partly because of Karachi’s suppression of the Bengali language, which then became the motor for a linguistic nationalism in Bangladesh that looks very similar to earlier linguistic nationalisms in Greece, Norway and Old Czechoslovakia. The newest nation-state in Asia, East Timor, which, in spite of its small size, contains over twenty ethnolinguistic groups, has opted for Portuguese as its language of state, and a simple lingua franca (Tetun) as the language of national unity. .
One could even argue, as I have done in another context, that electronic communications, combined with the huge migrations created by the present world-economic system, are creating a virulent new form of nationalism, which I call long-distance nationalism: a nationalism that no longer depends as it once did on territorial location in a home country. Some of the most vehement Sikh nationalists are Australians, Croatian nationalists, Canadians; Algerian nationalists, French; and Chinese, Americans. The internet, electronic banking and cheap international travel are allowing such people to have a powerful influence on the politics of their country of origin, even if they have no intention any longer of living there. This is one of the main ironic consequences of the processes popularly called globalization; it is yet another reason to believe that any sharp and unequivocal distinction between Asian and European nationalism lacks all validity.
WESTERN NATIONALISM AND EASTERN NATIONALISM https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii9/articles/benedict-anderson-western-nationalism-and-eastern-nationalism
The highlight of this article, is that globalisation, financialisation, migration, communications, internet has made a new kind of virulent nationalism.. the pravasi nationalism.. long-distance nationalism: a nationalism that no longer depends as it once did on territorial location in a home country. Some of the most vehement Sikh nationalists are Australians, Croatian nationalists, Canadians; Algerian nationalists, French; and Chinese, Americans. (check this
My notes on this article:
Imagined Communities : nationalisms of all varieties cannot be understood without reflecting on the older political forms out of which they emerged: kingdoms, and especially empires of the pre-modern and early modern sorts.
The earliest form of nationalism—one that I have called creole nationalism—arose out of the vast expansion of some of these empires overseas, often, but not always, very far away. It was pioneered by settler populations from the Old Country, who shared religion, language and customs with the metropole but increasingly felt oppressed by and alienated from it. The United States and the various states of Latin America which became independent between 1776 and 1830 are the famous examples of this type of nationalism.
A second form of nationalism, extensively discussed in Imagined Communities, and which seems relevant here, is what I have called, following Hugh Seton-Watson, official nationalism. This form of nationalism arose historically as a reactionary response to popular nationalisms from below, directed against rulers, aristocrats and imperial centres. The most famous example is provided by Imperial Russia, where the Tsars ruled over hundreds of ethnic groups and many religious communities, and in their own circles spoke French—a sign of their civilized difference from their subjects. It was as if only peasants spoke Russian. ..London tried to anglicize Ireland (with substantial success), Imperial Germany tried to germanify its share of Poland (with very little success), Imperial France imposed French on Italian-speaking Corsica (partial success) and the Ottoman Empire Turkish on the Arab world (with no success). ..
However, by far the most spectacular and ironical case is provided by the Celestial Empire, ruled from 1644 till its collapse, less than 90 years ago, by a Manchu—and also Manchu-speaking—dynasty. the dynasty vanished in 1911 and, to some extent, the Manchus as well.
When Chinese nationalism did finally arise, it was rather late in world-historical time...China was deeply penetrated by the various imperialisms of the age, including Japanese, but it was not actually colonized. There were too many competing imperialisms by then, and even Great Britain, which was having trouble swallowing vast India, blanched at the thought of swallowing even vaster imperial China...They thus without much thought, the popular nationalism of the worldwide anti-imperialist movement with the official nationalism of the late nineteenth century; and we know that this latter was a nationalism which emanated from the state, not the people, and thought in terms of territorial control, not popular liberation. ..Imperial China came, at different times, to accept the kinds of boundaries and new states that imperialism and anticolonial nationalism were forging, at least at the periphery: Mongolia, Korea, Vietnam, Burma, India and Pakistan.
It is probably fair to say that all organized societies in former times depended (in part) for their cohesion on visions of the past which were not too antagonistic to one another. These visions were transmitted by oral tradition, folk poetry, religious teachings, court chronicles, and so forth... When nationalism entered the world late in the eighteenth century, however, all this changed fundamentally. The accelerating speed with which social, cultural, economic and political change took hold, motored by the industrial revolution and modern communications systems, made the nation the first political–moral form which based itself firmly on the idea of progress.
What has happened in effect is that though there are countless traces of the past around us—monuments, temples, written records, tombs, artefacts, and so on—this past is increasingly inaccessible, external to us. At the same time, for all kinds of reasons, we feel we need it, if only as some sort of anchor. But this means that our relationship to the past is today far more political, ideological, contested, fragmentary, and even opportunistic than in ages gone by.
Let me finally turn to another form of nationalism, which, so far as I can tell, is clearly European in origin, and ask whether it can be said still to be Western in any useful sense. This form I call linguistic nationalism... Both India and the Philippines have failed—if that is the right word—to create a generally accepted national language. The colonial language—English and American—remains the effective language of the state and of the national elite. A vigorous English-language—and nationalist—literary culture exists in both places, and has accommodated itself to no less vigorous Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, Tagalog and Cebuano cultures. Old Pakistan broke into two separate nations partly because of Karachi’s suppression of the Bengali language, which then became the motor for a linguistic nationalism in Bangladesh that looks very similar to earlier linguistic nationalisms in Greece, Norway and Old Czechoslovakia. The newest nation-state in Asia, East Timor, which, in spite of its small size, contains over twenty ethnolinguistic groups, has opted for Portuguese as its language of state, and a simple lingua franca (Tetun) as the language of national unity. .
One could even argue, as I have done in another context, that electronic communications, combined with the huge migrations created by the present world-economic system, are creating a virulent new form of nationalism, which I call long-distance nationalism: a nationalism that no longer depends as it once did on territorial location in a home country. Some of the most vehement Sikh nationalists are Australians, Croatian nationalists, Canadians; Algerian nationalists, French; and Chinese, Americans. The internet, electronic banking and cheap international travel are allowing such people to have a powerful influence on the politics of their country of origin, even if they have no intention any longer of living there. This is one of the main ironic consequences of the processes popularly called globalization; it is yet another reason to believe that any sharp and unequivocal distinction between Asian and European nationalism lacks all validity.
How the BJP Promotes Hindutva through a Nationalist Agenda https://www.epw.in/engage/article/how-bjp-promotes-hindutva-through-nationalist PDF: https://www.epw.in/node/154321/pdf Under Modi, the BJP has espoused a more extreme ideology and used nationalism to gain support for right-wing policy, and to unite sentiments against religious minorities.
Suhas Palshikar: Instead of the coexistence of democracy, nationalism and diversity, binaries are now being posed upon the populace: democracy vs nationalism and nationalism vs diversity. Palshikar contends that this has led to the emergence of a new political elite and political culture in India, which in the absence of an effective political counter, could cement this new hegemony. (https://www.epw.in/journal/2018/33/indias-democracy-today/towards-hegemony.html)
Atul Sood: A “politics of hate” can work to build a consensus for ruling class economics. nationalism is often used by governments to hide their shortcomings, or to conceal fragmented social realities. BJP uses nationalism to appeal to the so-called “aspirational” class, whose impatience allows the party to make economic and social decisions on behalf of the nation. (https://www.epw.in/journal/2016/37/perspective/majoritarian-rationale-and-common-goals.html)
Ganshyam Shah: the BJP does not rely solely upon its Hindutva ideology to win votes, instead copying the Congress’ electoral strategy by building a base among OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis, and also by fielding numerous OBC candidates for mass support. While the Congress campaigned around the fact that the BJP was a communal party, they were unable to convince the masses why communal politics were dangerous to the nation. (https://www.epw.in/journal/1996/2-3/special-articles/gujarat-bjp-s-rise-power.html)
Anand Teltumbde : Gandhi first articulated Ram rajya as a concept during the freedom movement, but disassociated it from religion. Teltumbde contends that such a state under the BJP would exclude Dalits, Adivasis, and other minorities. the Congress is pedlling “soft Hindutva” to reiterate that it is not “anti-Hindu.”
Radhika Ramaseshan: The Tripura election result shows that demography played a larger role, with only 9% of the population Muslim. Further, the Hindu agenda failed to make inroads in other North East states, where its vegetarianism drive and “save the cow” campaign failed to resonate with voters.
The Hindutva Turn: Authoritarianism and Resistance in India Samaj South Asia Multidisciplinary Journal 24/25-2020 https://journals.openedition.org/samaj/epub/6632
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