‘REVELATIONS ON SNOOPING VINDICATE OUR STAND’ http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=111761 Kashmir Times. Dated: 7/21/2021 (link not working)
mobile numbers of several Elgaar Parishad accused were on a list of those selected for surveillance by an unidentified client of NSO. Such “tampering”, the relatives of the Elgaar accused say, strengthens the suspicion that the “evidence” against the detainees was planted on their electronic devices — as already suggested by American digital forensics firm Arsenal Consulting in the case of two accused.
Among the surveillance targets named by the exposé are academics Hany Babu MT, Vernon Gonsalves, Anand Teltumbde and Shoma Sen; activists Gautam Navlakha and Rona Wilson; and lawyers Arun Ferreira and Sudha Bharadwaj.
The numbers of several relatives and suspected associates of the Elgaar detainees too were on the list. They include: “Varavara Rao’s daughter Pavana; lawyer Surendra Gadling’s wife Minal Gadling, his associate lawyers Nihalsingh Rathod and Jagadish Meshram, one of his former clients Maruti Kurwatkar, who was charged in multiple cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), incarcerated for over four years and later released on bail; Bharadwaj’s lawyer Shalini Gera; Teltumbde’s friend Jaison Cooper, a Kerala-based rights activist; scholar of the Naxalite movement and Bastar-based lawyer Bela Bhatia; one of the oldest members of the Kabir Kala Manch cultural group Rupali Jadhav; and tribal rights activist Mahesh Raut’s close associate and lawyer Lalsu Nagoti,” a report in The Wire news website, which participated in the exposé, said. https://thewire.in/tag/pegasus-snooping
Global Surveillance of Journalists: A Technical Mapping of Tools, Tactics, and Threats https://www.ifj.org/fileadmin/Global_Surveillance_of_Journalists_-__A_Technical_Mapping_of_Tools__Tactics__and_Threats_JD_210426.docx.pdf Most journalists don’t realise they have been targeted until a forensic laboratory confirms an infection,
often months after the fact, when evidence has decayed. Only a handful of organisations worldwide –
including Citizen Lab, Amnesty International’s Security Lab and Access Now – have the expertise to
perform such analyses, and their resources are stretched thin.
Behind this lies a deeper governance vacuum – a world in which spyware exports are often unregulated,
legal, parliamentary and/or independent oversight is absent, and accountability for abuses becomes almost
impossible. Even where there is some form of, or attempt at, regulation, oversight is frequently uneven,
incomplete or inconsistently enforced across jurisdictions, and these existing mechanisms may be
inadequate to prevent abuse or ensure accountability.